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In response to post-crisis regulatory reforms, the European banking sector has under-
gone significant changes that have led banks to reconsider their strategies, structures and
operations. Based on a sample of over 3,000 banks from 32 European countries during
the period 2010–2017, we identify banks’ business models based on cluster analysis and
track their evolution. We then apply a logistic regression and find that banks with higher
risk and lower profitability are more likely to change their business model. Employing
a propensity score matching approach, we investigate the effect of migration on bank
performance and find that changing the business model affects banks positively (i.e. mi-
grating banks increase their profitability, stability and cost efficiency). The effect of mi-
gration differs depending on the target business model. When switches are a consequence
of being acquired or motivated by regulatory compliance, the positive impact remains.
Introduction
Since the global financial crisis, the European
banking sector has undergone fundamental
changes that have led banks to reconsider their
We are grateful to Marina Cernov (discussant); Rebel
Cole; Michael Engelhard; Claudia Girardone; Birgit
Höpfner (discussant); AndreaLandi (discussant); Jacque-
line Mills; Louis Nguyen (discussant); Anna Sarkisyan
(discussant); Mais Sha’ban (discussant); Oana Toader
(discussant); the participants at the Wolpertinger Confer-
ence (Modena, Italy, 2018); the International Workshop
on Financial System Architecture and Stability (IWF-
SAS, London, 2018); the Australasian Finance and Bank-
ing Conference (Sidney, 2018); the European Banking
Authority (EBA) Workshop (London, 2018); the Euro-
pean Banking Institute (EBI) Conference (2019, Frank-
furt), (DSGV), (AFME); INFINITI Conference (Glas-
gow, 2019); IFABS 2019, Agers (FR); the Workshop on
Bank Business Models (London, 2019); ADEIMF An-
nual Conference (Turin, Italy, 2019); the 2nd Interna-
tional Conference ‘Corporate Governance & Risk Man-
agement in Financial Institutions’ (Gallipoli, Italy, 2019);
the International Corporate Governance Society (ICGS)
(Colchester, UK, 2019) for the useful comments and sug-
gestions on previous versions of this paper. All errors re-
main ours.
business models (BMs). The introduction of new
and more stringent capital and liquidity regula-
tion under Basel III; the intensifying competition
by emerging Fintech firms under the new Eu-
ropean Union (EU) Payment Services Directive
(PSD2); the organizational restructuring imposed
by political choices (such as Brexit or state-aid
interventions); and a challenging macroeco-
nomic environment with negative interest rates
are among a few of the many challenges posed
to bank performance. To remain profitable in
such a fast-changing landscape, banks need to
prioritize their activities as well as their funding
sources. Boards’ strategic choices will be reflected
in changes in balance sheet composition, and
these will ultimately influence bank performance
and shareholders’ value.
Banks change their BM for a variety of rea-
sons: (i) to improve performance; (ii) to diver-
sify risks/products/markets/revenue sources; (iii)
to pursue growth strategies, via acquisitions; (iv)
as a consequence of changes in demand for
banking services; and (v) following regulatory
changes. Business model changes are strategic
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organizational changes, and similar tomergers and
acquisitions (M&As), do not always add value
(Malmendier, Moretti and Peters, 2018). In addi-
tion, frictions linked to BM switching, including
the costs – financial, organizational, technological
and staff-related – associated with the decision to
enter a new strategic business area, launch a new
line of products or compete in new fields where
incumbents have a competitive advantage (for in-
stance, a greater mastering of emerging technolo-
gies) may harm performance, at least in the short
term. This aspect might be even more crucial for
poorly performing banks ‘gambling for resurrec-
tion’ by changing their BM.
Against this background, this paper investigates
the determinants of bankBMmigrations and their
effects on bank performance. The importance of
understanding and analysing bank BMs was also
acknowledged by EU regulators: a central com-
ponent of the Supervisory Review and Evaluation
Process (SREP)1 is the requirement that the EU
competent supervisory authorities integrate bank
BMs into the supervisory framework.
More specifically, our study addresses the
following research questions: (i) What are the de-
terminants of a bank’s decision to change the BM?
(ii) What are the effects of such strategic decisions
on the bank performance (i.e. profitability, risk
and cost efficiency) in subsequent years? (iii) Are
the outcomes of migrations driven by exogenous
circumstances different from strategically driven
migrations?
To answer our research questions, we collect bal-
ance sheet data for a large sample of banks from
32 European Economic Area (EEA) countries and
Switzerland during the period 2010–2017. The
starting point of our empirical analysis is the iden-
tification of bank BMs, using cluster analysis. We
then track each bank over its lifetime in the sample
to assess whether it changes its BM. We find that,
in general, banks’ BMs are stable. Interestingly,
we do not reveal a specific pattern of migrations,
as switches cannot be attributed to bank size,
ownership structure, or geographical dimension.
The next step in our empirical analysis involves
the analysis of the drivers of BM migrations. We
apply logistic regressions to the entire sample and




likely to change their BM, perhaps in search of
profitability. Riskier banks are also more likely to
switch, possibly to diversify and reduce risk. Fi-
nally, we find that ownership structure matters,
with cooperative banks less likely to switch com-
pared to other ownership types.
The main aim of our analysis involves evaluat-
ing the performance effect of migrations. However,
comparing migrating and non-migrating banks
might yield biased estimates, as the performance
of these two groups might have been systemati-
cally different before the decision to migrate. To
overcome this issue, we use a propensity score
matching (PSM) approach and use it to evaluate
the effect of switching BMs on bank performance,
with the switch considered as the treatment, the
switchers as the treated sample and the non-
switcher as the untreated sample. Our results
suggest an improvement in bank performance
(i.e. higher profitability and lower cost efficiency)
in the years following the migration. Finally, we
attempt to disentangle the performance effect
of exogenously driven migrations from strategic
migrations. We find that when the BM switch is
exogenously driven, as in the case of banks that
were acquired or that received state aid, migrations
reduce insolvency risk, thereby providing evidence
supporting the interventions in the EU banking
sector during the crisis period. Our results are
robust to different model specifications, different
time windows and matching procedures.
The contributions of our paper are manifold.
First, we build on the literature on BM identifica-
tion (Foss and Saebi, 2017; Saebi, Lasse and Foss,
2017; Zott and Amit, 2007, 2010; Zott, Amit and
Massa, 2011) and present a detailed analysis of
the BMs of a large and representative sample of
European banks during an extended period, which
includes the years during and after the sovereign
debt crisis. We build upon the strand of the litera-
ture that posits balance sheet composition can be
linked more directly and stably to banks’ strategic
choices (Ayadi and de Groen, 2011; Farnè and
Vouldis, 2017; Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski, 2017;
Roengpitya, Tarashev and Tsatsaronis, 2014).
Second, we evaluate all BM migrations over the
sample period and present a detailed analysis of
migrating banks’ characteristics. Except for Ro-
engpitya et al. (2017), in most studies, bank BMs
are considered static and are identified once over
the sample period. Our analysis allows us to de-
velop an understanding of the changing banking
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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sector landscape post-crisis. Third, departing from
the previous literature that focused on the defini-
tion of BMs and the analysis of the relationship
between BMs and some accounting measures,
such as performance or risk (Altunbas, Man-
ganelli and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Ayadi and de
Groen, 2014; Kohler, 2015; Mergaerts and Vander
Vennet, 2016), we focus on the determinants of
migration. This is a novel contribution that im-
proves our understanding of the drivers of banks’
strategic choices. Finally, we investigate the effects
of migrations on bank performance. This allows
us to provide policy recommendations regarding
the impact of the changing regulatory and insti-
tutional landscape on banks’ BM decisions, and
the effect of these strategic changes on banks’
profitability, efficiency and risk profile.
Literature review
The BM concept has received increasing attention
in the academic literature, given that BM choices
affect firms’ value creation and performance
(Zott and Amit, 2008). Baden-Fuller and Morgan
(2010) argue that both the concept and definition
of BMs are useful to classify businesses in a tax-
onomy or typology; to compare their evolution
and investigate how businesses are coping with
technology and innovation. Despite the volumi-
nous literature,2 BM research has not yet reached
a consensus on definitions and classifications
(Baden-Fuller and Haefliger, 2013; Zott, Amit
andMassa, 2011), making it difficult for managers
to use research findings in their decision-making
(Fjeldstad and Snow, 2018). In the context of
our study, we consider the operational dimension
of the BM, that is, how a firm conducts its busi-
ness, in terms of its product/service offerings, its
target customers and the markets it is active in
(Christensen, 1997). We are also interested in the
dynamic dimension of a BM: how firms adapt
and change over time (Fjeldstad and Snow, 2018;
Teece, 2010). In particular, we will focus on bank
BMs as, unlike other service firms, their BMs are
influenced not only by the value proposition to
customers but also by regulatory restrictions.
The academic literature on bankBMs has grown
substantially in recent years, as the exogenous
2For a critical review of the literature on business models,
see, among others, Foss and Saebi (2017).
shocks of the financial and economic crises, and
the related re-regulation process, questioned the
pre-crisis models of doing business and drove
banks to reassess their choices and strategies. New
technologies, together with regulatory changes,
lead to a rapid shift in the provision of services,
including banking. This trend, which started with
the emergence of new electronic channels of deliv-
ery (Li, 2002), has been compounded by the global
financial crisis and the rapid growth of fintech in-
novation leveraging new technologies and the use
of ‘big data’ and their impact on firm performance
(Sena et al., 2019).
Two main issues have been investigated so far:
the definition and identification of specific BMs
and the link between types of BMs and bank char-
acteristics. An emerging stream of literature tries
to identify patterns in BM changes and measures
the effects of the transition from one model to
another.
Bank business model identification
The literature on bank BM identification builds on
the stream of the management literature that rests
on the idea that BMs are defined with respect to
the activities that a firm (bank) undertakes (Parmi-
giani and Mitchell, 2009; Saebi, Lasse and Foss,
2017; Vidal and Mitchell, 2013; Zott and Amit,
2007, 2010; Zott, Amit andMassa, 2011). Accord-
ingly, studies that follow this general approach
have tried to offer an acceptable classification of
bank BMs using balance sheet data (Ayadi and de
Groen, 2011, 2014; Flori, Giansante, Girardone,
and Pammolli 2019; Hryckiewicz and Kozlowski,
2017; Roengpitya, Tarashev and Tsatsaronis,
2014). As balance sheet structure can be linked
more directly to banks’ strategic choices com-
pared to income composition, income statement
variables are not used to define BMs. Instead,
as financial and economic results depend on the
strategy adopted, they are used primarily ex-post
to gauge the existence of differential performance
among different BMs.
Although the allocation of banks to busi-
ness clusters is mainly data-driven, it incor-
porates subjective elements, since researchers
select the balance sheet dimensions to per-
form hierarchical clustering. Two recent stud-
ies by Farnè and Vouldis (2017) and Roeng-
pitya, Tarashev, Tsatsaronis, and Villegas (2017)
propose a data-driven approach to minimize
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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subjective views and expert judgement in the
choice of clustering variables. Taking a completely
different approach, a recent study by Cernov and
Urbano (2018) proposes a mixed methodology for
BM classification, combining both qualitative and
quantitative components. Although leveraging dif-
ferentmethods, all studies tend to identify four/five
different clusters that distinguish between retail-
oriented and market-oriented BMs. On the one
hand, banks that remain closer to the traditional
intermediation role, relying more on retail funding
and customer loans; on the other hand, banks that
engage in less stable funding and trading activities,
such as wholesale and investment banks.
The relationship between business models and bank
characteristics
A further strand of literature investigates the rela-
tionship between bank BMs and bank characteris-
tics, such as size, capitalization, risk, performance,
operating efficiency and ownership (Altunbas,
Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez, 2011; Ayadi
and de Groen, 2014; De Meo, De Nicola, Lusig-
nani, Orsini, and Zicchino 2018; Hryckiewicz
and Kozlowski, 2017; Köhler, 2015; Mergaerts
and Vander Vennet, 2016) or market features,
such as changes in yield curve factors, in a zero
interest-rate environment or the major global
distress events starting from the global financial
crisis (Flori et al., 2019; Lucas, Schaumburg and
Schwaab, 2019).
This literature’s main findings suggest that
market-oriented BMs (investment and wholesale
banks) delivered higher performance before the
financial crisis, although at the expense of a
more significant accumulation of risk. In con-
trast, retail-oriented banks contributed to the real
economy significantly more than other BMs. Re-
tail banks also appear to perform better in the
long run (during and after the financial and eco-
nomic crises) as they exhibited higher profitability
in terms of return on assets (ROA), return on eq-
uity (ROE) and net interest margin (NIM) in ad-
dition to lower vulnerability to distress (Mergaerts
and Vander Vennet, 2016).
The evolution of bank business models
In most studies, BMs are considered static and are
identified once over the sample period. Given the
profound structural changes in banking markets
post-crisis, this assumption might be limiting. To
the best of our knowledge, only the recent study by
Roengpitya et al. (2017) considers how bank BMs
have evolved and the extent to which the transition
impacts relative performance, measured by ROE,
around the time of the switch. Somewhat surpris-
ingly, they find no evidence that underperformers
are inclined to switch.
Data and descriptive statistics
Data
Our initial sample is composed of 3,287 banks
from 32 EEA countries and Switzerland during
the period 2010–2017, for a total of 23,883 bank-
year observations. The sample covers more than
95% of the total banking assets in the EEA. In
terms of specialization, our sample includes 815
commercial banks, 692 savings banks, 1,702 co-
operative banks, 78 public banks and 32 banks
that were nationalized during the crisis period.
Data are collected from several data sources: bank-
specific variables from SNL (S&P Global Market
Intelligence); macroeconomic variables from the
World Bank; state aid information from the Euro-
pean Central Bank and the European Commission
databases; and corporate operations data (M&A)
from the Zephyr database (Bureau Van Dijk).
Identification of business models
Our starting point is the identification of bank
BMs, using cluster analysis. We build upon the
work of Ayadi and de Groen (2014) and adopt
Ward’s method (Ward, 1963), which is a criterion
applied in hierarchical cluster analysis with the aim
of grouping together entities with similar charac-
teristics. All bank-year observations are clustered
together, andWard’s algorithm is run only once for
the whole period investigated (2010–2017).3
Assuming that banks choose their BM, the in-
strumental variables adopted to define the BMs are
based on the balance sheet variables over which we
posit that banks have full control and can manage.
Specifically, five instruments were used to form the
3Although the average cluster characteristics remain con-
stant during the sample period, the key advantage of this
method is that the entire dataset is used for inference on
cluster allocation and cluster means. This allows us to ob-
serve the migrations among different business models, be-
cause clusters are linked together across time.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 1. Bank business model definition
Note: The figure shows the differences in terms of bank assets and liabilities in the five BMs identified. The items with an asterisk are
those used in the cluster analysis to define the number of clusters. Focused retail, diversified retail (type 1 and type 2) are those BMs that
are more retail-oriented, which differ on the diversification of the asset and liability sides. The wholesale BM groups banks oriented to the
interbank market and the investment BM groups those banks more oriented to trading activities.
clusters: loans to banks, customer loans, trading
assets, debt liabilities and derivative exposures; all
variables are considered as a percentage of total
assets.4 In line with the literature, our cluster anal-
ysis results document the presence of five BMs in
the European banking industry:
(i) Focused retail (i.e. banks that use customer
deposits as the primary means for funding
loans and maintain relatively high levels of
loss-absorbing capital); these institutions fol-
low the traditional financial intermediation
model.
(ii) Diversified retail (i.e. banks that are still retail-
oriented, and yet more diversified than fo-
cused retail banks, either on the asset side
(type 1) or the liability side (type 2)). More
specifically, type 1 BM groups retail-oriented
banks, whose asset side, along with loans, also
present more trading assets than focused re-
tail banks. Type 2 BM includes banks that
have significantly more trading assets than fo-
cused retail banks, and also are more reliant
on debt and short-term market funding.
(iii) Wholesale, which groups together banks that
are heavily wholesale oriented and largely ac-
tive in the interbank markets.
(iv) Investment, banks that have substantial trad-
ing activities; this includes large universal
banks with a significant investment banking
division as well as pure investment banks.
Figure 1 shows the differences, in terms of assets
and liabilities, for the five BMs identified. Items
with an asterisk are those used in the cluster anal-
ysis to define five BMs.5
4More specific information about the clustering method-
ology and the variables are included in the online Sup-
porting Information (1. The cluster analysis).
5More details about the distribution of banks among
business models, by year, by country, by ownership struc-
ture, etc., are included in the online Supporting Infor-
mation (2. Stylized facts on bank business models and
migrations).
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 1. Business model migrations
Category Number of banks Bank-year observations
Non-migrating 1,815 21,825
Migrating: 1,472 2,058
- One migration 998 998
- More than one migration: 474 1,060
 Progressively 353 789
 Revert back 121 271
Total 3,287 23,883
Note: The table shows the composition of the sample in terms of the number of banks and bank-year observations, distinguishing
between migrating and non-migrating banks. Migrating banks and bank-year observations are divided between banks that switch only
once and those that switch more than once. Banks that change BM more than once during the sample period are further divided
into banks that change BM progressively (e.g. from focused retail to a more diversified BM) and banks that eventually revert to their
previous BM.
Identifying business model migrations
Given that we are interested in BM changes, we
track each bank over its lifetime in the sample to
assess whether it switches BM. Tomake sure we do
not identify anomalous migrations (i.e. driven by
one-off, extraordinary balance sheet operations),
we consider a bank as having changed its BM only
if the bank does not return to the previous BM in
the following year.6 More specifically, we are inter-
ested in stablemigrations, that is when: (a) the bank
maintains the same BM for at least 2 years after
migration; or (b) the yearly change in BM refers to
a continuous evolution of BMs, from focused to
diversified or vice versa.
Table 1 shows the results of our initial analy-
sis regarding the distribution of migrating banks.
From a total of 3,287 banks in our sample, 1,472
banks migrate at least once. Among migrating
banks, 998 banks change BM just once and remain
in the new BM for the rest of the sample period.
The remaining 474 banks switch more than once.
We observe two types of migrations: (a) banks that
change BM in a progressive direction (i.e. from fo-
cused to diversified or vice versa); (b) banks that re-
vert to their initial BM.Within the group of banks
thatmigratemore than once, 353 banks switch pro-
gressively and 121 banks eventually return to the
original BM. Therefore, in most cases, migration is
permanent, andwhen banksmovemore than once,
they generally do not return to the initial model. In
6As the cluster analysis is carried out on year-end annual
balance sheet data, we want to avoid treating as migra-
tion those temporary (1-year) switches that might sim-
ply depend on the yearly change of the distance between
clusters.
terms of the total number of observations in the
period under investigation (2010–2017), we iden-
tify 2,058migrations, corresponding to about 8.6%
of the sample (23,883 observations).
Next, we analyse migrations by bank size, by
ownership and distinguishing between Eurozone
and non-Eurozone countries.7 To account for the
possible crisis-induced changes in BMs, we di-
vide the sample period into two subperiods: the
sovereign debt crisis (2010–2013) and recovery
(2014–2017).
Following the European Central Bank, we iden-
tify three size groups using a threshold based
on the total assets of the banking sector in
the preceding year. Large banks are those banks
with total assets greater than 0.5% of the over-
all sector; medium banks are banks with total
assets between 0.5% and 0.005%; small banks
are banks with total assets less than 0.005% of
the total. Table 2(Panel A) shows that the mi-
grations are distributed in a similar way across
medium and small banks, while a lower per-
centage of migrations is detectable in the group
of large banks. Regarding the banks’ ownership
structure, we see that migrations are evenly dis-
tributed; nonetheless, a higher percentage of mi-
7The Eurozone is an economic and monetary union of
19 of the 28 EU member states (as of 2019). The orig-
inal 11 Eurozone countries are: Austria, Belgium, Fin-
land, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Since then, other coun-
tries have joined: Greece (2001); Cyprus (2008); Malta
(2008); Slovakia (2009); Estonia (2011); Latvia (2014);
Lithuania (2015); and Slovenia (2017). We consider
non-Eurozone banks from EUmember states which have
not adopted the euro as their national currency.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
Academy of Management.
Bank Business Model Migrations in Europe 7
Table 2. Distribution of migrating and non-migrating banks by size, ownership structure, geographical area and temporal distribution
Non-migrating banks Migrating banks
Number of observations Percentage Number of observations Percentage
Panel A: Bank size
Large 310 96.27% 12 3.73%
Medium 4,972 91.67% 452 8.33%
Small 16,543 91.21% 1,594 8.79%
Panel B: Bank ownership
Commercial 4,914 88.91% 613 11.09%
Cooperative 11,423 91.75% 1,027 8.25%
Nationalized 188 87.04% 28 12.96%
Public 533 94.34% 32 5.66%
Savings 4,767 93.01% 358 6.99%
Panel C: Eurozone
Eurozone 17,480 91.22% 1,683 8.78%
Non-Eurozone 4,345 92.06% 375 7.94%
Panel D: Geographic distribution
Mediterranean 4,160 88.21% 556 11.79%
Eastern Europe 446 85.44% 76 14.56%
Continental/Nordic Europe 17,219 92.35% 1,426 7.65%
Panel E: Temporal distribution
Crisis 11,633 93.49% 810 6.51%
Recovery 10,192 89.09% 1,248 10.91%
Total 21,825 91.38% 2,058 8.62%
Note: Panel A shows the distribution of migrating and non-migrating among banks of different sizes: large, medium and small. The
size buckets are identified using the ECB threshold based on the total assets of the banking sector in the preceding year. Large banks
are banks with total assets greater than 0.5% of the overall sector; medium banks are banks with total assets between 0.5% and 0.005%;
small banks are banks with total assets of less than 0.005% of the total. Panel B shows the distribution of migrating and non-migrating
banks considering bank ownership: cooperative, commercial, savings, public and nationalized banks. Panel C shows the distribution
of migrating and non-migrating banks in the Eurozone and non-Eurozone. Finally, Panel D shows the distribution of migrating and
non-migrating banks in the Mediterranean, Eastern and Continental/Nordic European countries. We consider Continental/Nordic
European countries: AT, BE, CH, DE, DK, FI, GB, IE, IS, LI, LU, NL, SE. We consider Eastern European countries: BG, CZ, EE,
HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK. We include in the group of Mediterranean countries: CY, ES, FR, GR, HR, IT, MT, PT, SI. Panel E shows
the distribution of migrating and non-migrating banks in the crisis (2010–2013) and recovery (2014–2017) periods.
grations is present among nationalized and com-
mercial banks – 12.96% and 11.09%, respectively
(Table 2, Panel B).
Next, we investigate the distribution of migra-
tions by the country of origin of the parent bank.
First, we distinguish between Eurozone and non-
Eurozone banks. Table 2(Panel C) shows a simi-
lar distribution of migrating banks in the two ge-
ographical areas. In Table 2(Panel D) we distin-
guish between Mediterranean countries, Eastern
European countries and Continental/Nordic Eu-
ropean countries.
We find that migrations are more frequent for
banks headquartered in the Mediterranean and
Eastern European countries. This result could be
ascribed to their greater exposure to extreme in-
stitutional environments during our sample pe-
riod. Southern Eurozone countries such as Greece,
Italy and Spain were among the hardest hit by
the sovereign debt crisis. Eastern European coun-
tries’ banking sectors faced an aggressive reduc-
tion in lending by foreign-owned banks in re-
sponse to the difficulties faced by parent banks
in their home countries after the financial cri-
sis (Iwanicz-Drozdowska, Bongini, Smaga, and
Witkowski 2018).
Finally, in Table 2(Panel E) we look at the
distribution of migrations over time: we observe
that more migrations took place in the post-crisis
period (10.91% vs. 6.51%), which is consistent
with the restructuring the industry experienced
post-crisis.
The analysis of migrations indicates that, by and
large, BMs are stable over time; however, transi-
tions do occur. Interestingly, we were unable to
uncover a specific pattern as switches cannot be
traced back to bank size, ownership structure, or
geographical dimension.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Figure 2. Transition chart for the period 2010–2017 and final distribution of the number of banks among different business models [Colour
figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: The figure shows the share of banks that belong to a specific model in one period switching to a different model and those remaining
in the BM in the following period. The table shows the distribution of banks among the different BMs during the crisis and recovery period,
and the distribution over the total period. When the transition between two BMs is not shown, it means that the migration is lower than
0.5%.
In the next step, we link the migrations to the
different types of BMs identified for our sample
of banks.
Figure 2 illustrates the transition matrix (in
terms of the number of banks) for the five mod-
els, during the sample period. Focused retail banks
show the highest persistence in their chosen BM:
90% remains within the same BM throughout
the entire period. Similarly, the majority of di-
versified retail (type 1) banks maintains the same
BM (87.7%), whereas the percentage is slightly
lower for the other three BMs: less than 80%
in the case of diversified retail (type 2) and in-
vestment banks; even lower for wholesale banks.
Considering both inflows and outflows from one
BM to another, focused retail banks are net ac-
quirers (+13.27%) along with diversified retail
(type 1) (+25.64%). By contrast, all other mod-
els lose more banks than they receive. Our re-
sults show a general tendency towards more retail-
oriented BMs (i.e. focused retail and diversified
type 1).
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 3. Distribution of migrations among different business models (percentage of total assets)
Business models Focused retail Diversified (type 1) Diversified (type 2) Wholesale Investment
Panel A: Full sample period (2010–2017)
Period t−1 Focused retail 88.27% 5.94% 5.25% 0.33% 0.21%
Diversified (type 1) 2.91% 83.21% 5.20% 0.88% 7.80%
Diversified (type 2) 3.21% 3.90% 92.27% 0.04% 0.58%
Wholesale 1.85% 7.75% 0.10% 87.28% 3.03%
Investment 0.08% 4.69% 2.03% 0.68% 92.53%
Total 3.94% 8.90% 4.62% 3.62% 3.35%
Panel B: Eurozone crisis period (2010–2013)
Period t−1 Focused retail 90.42% 7.82% 0.86% 0.34% 0.55%
Diversified (type 1) 3.34% 81.05% 2.67% 0.59% 12.35%
Diversified (type 2) 1.46% 4.19% 93.01% 0.00% 1.34%
Wholesale 3.59% 7.27% 0.23% 85.55% 3.35%
Investment 0.02% 7.55% 0.95% 0.30% 91.18%
Crisis 10.73% 55.81% 8.39% 2.35% 22.72%
Panel C: Eurozone recovery period (2014–2017)
Period t−1 Focused retail 87.03% 4.87% 7.77% 0.32% 0.01%
Diversified (type 1) 2.68% 84.38% 6.56% 1.04% 5.34%
Diversified (type 2) 4.34% 3.71% 91.80% 0.06% 0.09%
Wholesale 0.63% 8.08% 0.00% 88.48% 2.80%
Investment 0.12% 2.35% 2.91% 0.99% 93.63%
Recovery 23.23% 30.34% 30.21% 6.00% 10.22%
Note: Panel A reports the distribution of migrations among different BMs during the whole period investigated (2010–2017). Shaded
entries on the diagonal show the percentage of total assets of banks that do not migrate. Panel B reports the distribution of bank
migrations in terms of total assets (%) during the Eurozone crisis period (2010–2013) and Panel C refers to the recovery period (2014–
2017). The entries in bold (Total, Crisis and Recovery) illustrate the percentage of total bank assets that migrate from other BMs to
the BM observed during the period.
Table 3 shows the distribution of migrations
among different BMs. Table 3(Panel A) reports
transitions across models over the entire sample
period: we highlight which BMs are stable and
which BMs are the most attractive (net acquir-
ers). ‘Banks that moved to the focused retail BM
represent less than 10% of total bank assets. The
highest percentage of assets migrated to the di-
versified retail (type 1) BM, suggesting that banks
refocused their activity towards the retail busi-
ness, yet without losing the diversification of their
funding sources. Table 3(Panels B and C) reports
the transition matrix focusing on the two subpe-
riods considered (i.e. sovereign debt crisis period
(2010–2013) and recovery (2014–2017)). During
the crisis period, we observe that banks migrated
to the diversified retail (type 1) and investment
BM,while during the recovery period, larger banks
moved to the diversified retail (type 1 and type 2)
BM.
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for
the full sample, comparing the characteristics of
banks that migrate with those that do not. Our
findings emphasize that, on average, migrating
banks have lower profitability and lower cost ef-
ficiency (higher cost-to-income ratio). They also
display a lower credit portfolio quality, a higher
loan loss provision ratio, even if the difference
in means is not significant. Referring to the bal-
ance sheet structure, migrating banks are smaller,
better capitalized, have a higher risk appetite and
lower financial stability (a lower Z-score).8 More-
over, our findings suggest that migrating banks
have fewer loans to customers and more trading
activities. Concerning their funding strategy, mi-
grating banks have fewer customer deposits over
total assets, suggesting a more diversified funding
structure.
8The Z-score estimates the number of standard deviations
that the bank’s profits have to fall below its expected value
before its equity becomes negative. We calculate the Z-
score for a bank as the sum of its capital ratio and return
on assets, divided by the standard deviation of its return
on assets. The popularity of the Z-score stems from the
fact that it has a negative relationship to the probability
of bank insolvency (i.e. the probability that the value of
bank assets becomes lower than the value of bank debt).
A higher Z-score, therefore, implies a lower probability
of insolvency (see, among others, Anginer et al., 2014;
Laeven and Levine, 2009).
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 5. Variable definition
Variable Definition Source
ROA Return on total assets, as a measure of profitability SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
EQ_TA Equity over total assets, as a measure of capitalisation SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
INTANGIBLE_TA Intangible assets over total assets SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
C_I Cost-to-income ratio, as a measure of operating efficiency SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
Z-score The Z-score measured as [(equity over total assets + the mean
of bank’s ROA)/the standard deviation of bank’s ROA)]
SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
Authors’ calculations
RWA Risk weighted assets over total assets as a measure of
regulatory risk requirement
SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
COMMERCIAL A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a commercial bank,
0 otherwise
SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
COOPERATIVE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a cooperative bank,
0 otherwise
SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
SAVINGS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a saving bank, 0
otherwise
SNL (S&P Global Market Intelligence)
STATE AID A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank received a state aid
during the financial crisis, 0 otherwise
European Commission and
European Central Bank databases
M&A A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is involved in a merger
& acquisition (M&A), 0 otherwise
Zephyr Database (Bureau Van Dijk)
TARGET A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is the target of a
merger & acquisition (M&A), 0 otherwise
Zephyr Database (Bureau Van Dijk)
FOCUS A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank business model is the
focused retail BM, 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
TYPE1 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank business model is the
diversified retail (type 1) BM, 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
TYPE2 A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank business model is the
diversified retail (type 2) BM, 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
WHOLESALE A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank business model is the
wholesale BM, 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
INVESTMENT A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank business model is the
investment BM, 0 otherwise
Authors’ calculations
Note: The Table reports the description of the variables used in the empirical analysis, and, in the last column, it says the sources.
Empirical analysis
The determinants of business model migration
To answer our first research question – that is,
what are the determinants of a bank’s decision to
change the BM–we apply logistic regression to the
entire sample model to assess the determinants of
migrations:




+ Ykt + εit > 0) (1)
where α0 is a constant, K denotes the number of
explanatory variables Xk,it−1 in the selection equa-
tion, Si are country dummies, Yt are year dum-
mies and εit is an identically and independently
distributed error term. On the left-hand side, the
dependent variable wit is set to 1 in the year t in
which bank i migrates, measuring the probability
of switching, and 0 otherwise. Variable definitions
are reported in Table 5.
We consider three sets of bank-specific vari-
ables. The first set reflects the size, risk profile,
efficiency, stability and profitability of our sam-
ple banks plus their ownership structure. Size is
proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets;
the risk profile is captured by the leverage ratio
(the ratio of equity over total assets, E_TA) and
by a measure of risk appetite (i.e. the ratio of
risk-weighted assets (RWA) over total assets). To
define operating efficiency and profitability, we
use, respectively, the cost-to-income ratio (C_I)
and the return on average assets (ROA). Bank
stability is proxied by Z-score, measured as the
sum of total equity over total assets and the
average return on total assets over the standard
deviation of total assets (Z-SCORE). We also add
a proxy for investments in financial technologies,
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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measured by the ratio of intangible assets over
total assets (INTANGIBLE_TA), to control for
the possibility that the change in BM is driven by
the strategic choice of increasing investment in
new technology to embrace the fintech revolution
and the related changes in demand for banking
services. Finally, we add three different dummies
to control for the ownership form of our sample
banks: a dummy COMMERCIAL, equal to 1 if
the bank is a commercial bank and 0 otherwise; a
dummy COOPERATIVE, equal to 1 if the bank
is a cooperative and 0 otherwise; and a dummy
SAVINGS, equal to 1 if the bank is a savings and
loan institution and 0 otherwise.9
Next, we include the BMs adopted by the banks
in the period before the year observed (t−1) to
check whether the probability of migration differs
according to the specific BM initially adopted. We
include four dummy variables: (i) FOCUSED_BM
equals 1 if the bank adopted the focused retail BM
in the year before the migration and 0 otherwise;
(ii) TYPE1_BM equals 1 if the bank was a di-
versified retail (type 1) banks in the year before
the migration and 0 otherwise; (iii) TYPE2_BM
equals 1 if the bank is a diversified retail (type 2)
bank in the year before the migration and 0 other-
wise; (iv) WHOLESALE_BM equals 1 if the bank
adopted the wholesale BM in the year before the
migration and 0 otherwise. All bank-specific vari-
ables are lagged one period at time t−1. Finally,
we also include time fixed effect and country fixed
effect to control for other institutional differences
among countries and years not captured by other
variables.10
The results of the logistic regressions (odd ra-
tios and average marginal effects) are reported in
Table 6. The second and third columns report the
estimates of Model 1, that includes financial state-
ment and ownership information, the fourth and
fifth columns show the results of Model 2, which
also controls for the BMs adopted by the banks
in the year before the migration. We find that the
smaller the bank size, the lower its profitability and
9When the four variables are 0 in all cases, the bank is a
public or a nationalized bank.
10We do not control for differences in the regulatory
framework. Since we focus on European countries, we as-
sume a level of harmonization of the regulatory frame-
work. Country-specific regulations that may affect banks’
decisions to change BM (or discourage banks from
switching) should be controlled for by country fixed ef-
fects.
the higher its risk appetite, the higher its probabil-
ity of migration.
Cooperative banks are less likely to change their
BMs during the period under investigation than
banks under other ownership forms. This is con-
sistent with the fact that, as cooperative banks
are typically not profit maximizers, they are less
likely to respond quickly to changes in the com-
petitive environment and might need more time to
implement changes. Looking at the BM adopted
before the migration, our findings suggest that
more retail-oriented banks – those that adopt the
focused retail and diversified retail (type 1) BMs –
are 7.2 percentage points less likely to change their
BM than investment banks (in our analysis this is
the reference category), conversely, diversified re-
tail (type 2) banks are 3.4 percentage points more
likely to change their BM than investment banks.
In sum, in the last decade, migrations among the
different bank BMs have been mainly determined
by bank-specific variables, such as profitability and
riskiness, but also by the ownership structure and
the initial BM. The next step of our analysis is to
check whether these changes have been beneficial
to migrating banks to support the bank’s strategy.
The effects of business model migration on bank
performance
To answer our second research question, we need
to determine the effects of migration on bank
performance. This evaluation gives rise to several
methodological issues, particularly self-selection
concerns, with regard to the endogeneity of the
decision to migrate.11 First, the comparison of
migrating banks to non-migrating banks might
yield biased estimates of the migration effects
because the performance of non-migrating banks
may differ systematically from the performance of
migrating banks, even in the absence of migration.
Therefore, if migrating banks are found to per-
form better, on average, than non-migrating banks,
we may not be able to disentangle whether this
difference could be ascribed to the change of BM
or differences in the banks’ characteristics prior to
the migration. Second, considering only migrating
banks eliminates the possibility of benchmarking
11These methodological issues are present in any study
aimed at estimating the effect of a specific strategic deci-
sion on bank performance. Casu et al. (2013) and Barba
Navaretti and Castellani (2008) discuss similar issues.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 6. Determinants of banks’ propensity to migrate
Model 1 Model 2
Variables Odds Margins Odds Margins
Constant −0.269 – 0.536 –
(0.560) (0.573)
ETAt−1 −0.241 −0.020 0.0.346 −0.028
(0.379) (0.032) (0.372) (0.031)
INTANGIBLE_TAt−1 −3.848 −0.322 −6.044 −0.499
(4.438) (0.375) (4.539) (0.378)
SIZE −0.097** −0.008** −0.129** −0.011**
(0.018) (0.001) (0.019) (0.001)
ROAt−1 −5.195** −0.439** −4.487** −0.374**
(1.138) (0.096) (1.113) (0.092)
COST_INCOMEt−1 −0.002 −0.0002 −0.003 −0.0002
(0.009) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001)
RWAt−1 0.041** 0.003** 0.043** 0.003**
(0.013) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001)
Z_SCOREt−1 −0.0007 −6.3e−05 −0.0003 −2.5e−05
(0.0005) (0.000) (0.0004) (0.000)
COMMERCIAL 0.068 0.005 0.155 0.012
(0.170) (0.014) (0.172) (0.014)
COOPERATIVE −0.404** −0.034** −0.234 −0.019
(0.181) (0.015) (0.183) (0.015)
SAVINGS −0.109 −0.009 0.143 0.011
(0.182) (0.015) (0.183) (0.015)
BM_FOCUSEDt−1 – – −0.870** −0.072**
(0.113) (0.009)
BM_TYPE1t−1 – – −0.630** −0.052**
(0.108) (0.009)
BM_TYPE2t−1 – – 0.408** 0.034**
(0.120) (0.010)
BM_WHOLESALEt−1 – – −0.034 −0.002
(0.132) (0.011)
YEAR FE YES YES YES YES
COUNTRY FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 17,137 17,137 17,137 17,137
No. banks 3,062 3,062 3,062 3,062
R-squared 0.0317 – 0.0572 –
Log likelihood −5,244.5875 – −5,106.1998 –
Note: The table reports both odds ratios and average marginal effects (AME) coefficients of the logit regression estimates of banks’
propensity to migrate. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a bank changes its BM and 0 otherwise. All explanatory variables, with
the exception of ownership structure, are lagged 1 year. ETA is the equity over total assets; FINTECH is the ratio between intangible
assets and total assets; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; ROA is the return over total assets; COST_INCOME is the cost
over total income; RWA is the risk-weighted assets over total assets; COMMERCIAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a
commercial bank and 0 otherwise; COOPERATIVE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a cooperative bank and 0 otherwise;
SAVINGS is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is a savings bank and 0 otherwise; BM_FOCUSED is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the bank has a focused retail BM in the year before the migration and 0 otherwise; BM_TYPE1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if
the bank has a diversified retail (type 1) BM in the year before the migration and 0 otherwise; BM_TYPE2 is a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the bank has a diversified retail (type 2) BM in the year before the migration and 0 otherwise; BM_WHOLESALE is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the bank has a wholesale BM in the year before the migration and 0 otherwise.
∗∗*** Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
the hypothetical performance that the bank would
have had, had it not changed its BM.
To mitigate these endogeneity issues, we em-
ploy a PSM approach. Matching is a popular non-
parametric approach; it is largely adopted in pol-
icy impact analysis (Essama-Nssah, 2006) and has
been adopted in the finance literature to gauge the
impact of diverse strategic choices (Casu, Clare,
Sarkisyan, and Thomas 2013; Palvia, Vahamaa
and Vahamaa, 2015; Villalonga, 2004).
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 7. The effect of migration on bank performance
ATET Coefficient Std. Error 95% confidence interval
ROAt − ROAt−1 −0.003 0.0034 −0.0074 0.0061
ROAt+1 − ROAt 0.003 0.0029 −0.0016 0.01
ROAt+2 − ROAt 0.005** 0.0024 0.001 0.0124
Zt − Zt−1 0.4512 1.202 −1.804 2.705
Zt+1 − Zt 4.244** 1.515 −1.633 7.502
Zt+2 − Zt 4.125** 1.576 1.238 7.421
C_It – C_It−1 0.0961** 0.0560 −0.0137 0.205
C_It+1 – C_It −0.165** 0.0921 0.0.345 0.0152
C_It+2 – C_It −0.044 0.0779 −0.1969 0.1084
RWAt – RWAt−1 −0.062 0.0635 −0.1866 0.0622
RWAt+1 – RWAt 0.0418 0.0490 −0.0532 0.1390
RWAt+2 – RWAt −0.0274 0.0228 −0.0721 0.0172
Note: The table reports the effects of migration on bank performance, shown as the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). If
the ATET is different from zero, the change in the performance indicator over the time window is different for switching banks, com-
pared to their matched non-switching peers. Wematched migrating banks with banks that never migrate during the period investigated,
on the propensity score, by means of nearest-neighbour matching with replacement, with a 1% caliper. This resulted in 1,585 bank-year
observations in the treated group and 4,762 bank-year observations in the control group. The performance indicators are: ROA as a
proxy of bank’s profitability, Z-score as a proxy of risk of default, the cost-to-income ratio (C_I) as a proxy of bank’s cost efficiency,
RWA is the risk-weighted assets density and is a proxy of risk appetite. We test the effect of migration on different time windows. The
matching variables are those used in the main analysis to measure the propensity score. The number of matches is equal to 4.
∗∗*** Statistical significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
To determine the impact of BM migration on
bank performance, we focus on two groups of
banks: the treatment group for the PSM analy-
sis consists of banks that switch BM in any year
from 2011 to 2017; the control group is built from
banks that never switch BM over the same pe-
riod. This results in 1,585 bank-year observations
in the treatment group and 15,398 bank-year ob-
servations in the control group. We then proceed
to the implementation of PSM, which can be bro-
ken down into three different phases: (i) estimating
the propensity score; (ii) matchingmigrating banks
with non-migrating banks; and (iii) estimating the
effect of migration on the bank’s performance.
The propensity score is estimated, starting with the
full model presented in Table 6 (Model 2).12 Our
matching procedure controls for: (i) bank-specific
characteristics in terms of profitability, efficiency,
stability and risk; (ii) bank ownership; and (iii)
bank BMs at year t−1. This allows us to compare
banks that share the same cluster (BM) and are
very similar in terms of profitability, risk and own-
ership, differing only for the decision to change
the BM. Once the propensity scores are estimated,
we proceed to match migrating banks with banks
that never migrate during the period investigated.
We employ nearest-neighbour matching with re-
placement, and impose a caliper of 1% tominimize
the risk of bad matches and increase the match-
ing quality (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This
leaves us with 1,585 bank-year observations in the
treated group and 4,762 bank-year observations in
the matched control group.13
We now use the matched samples to estimate
the effects of migration on a set of bank perfor-
mance measures: profitability, proxied by ROA;
bank soundness, proxied by distance to default (Z-
score); cost efficiency (measured by cost-to-income
ratio); and finally, risk appetite (measured by RWA
density). To detect the treatment effect on different
years, for each outcome, we consider three differ-
ent time windows: (i) the year of treatment; (ii) the
year after migration; and (iii) the longer term, with
a 2-year window around the time of migration.
Table 7 reports the effects of migration on bank
performance, shown as the average treatment ef-
fect on the treated (ATET). The interpretation of
the results is as follows: if the ATET is different
from zero, the change in the performance indica-
tor over the time window is different for switching
12This was possible because we included in the first step of
the analysis all variables that do not depend on the treat-
ment (i.e. the migration) (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
13The interested reader can refer to the online Support-
ing Information (3. Propensity score matching) for details
about the distributions of the pre-matching sample and
the post-matching sample.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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banks, compared to their matched non-switching
peers. Our findings suggest that the migration has
a negative (but not significant) effect on bank prof-
itability only in the year of migration, when we ex-
pect the higher incidence of the costs of migration
to materialize. In the subsequent years [t; t+1] and
[t+1; t+2], migrating banks perform better than
non-migrating banks. Looking at the coefficients
of the Z-score, we observe a positive and signif-
icant coefficient, indicating that migrating banks
improve their stability following migration more
than non-migrating banks. Finally, after an in-
crease in the year of migration, we find a negative
coefficient for the cost-to-income ratio and the mi-
gration, indicating that migrating banks improve
their cost efficiency after the migration more than
non-migrating banks.
To summarize, our results indicate an improve-
ment in bank performance following migration
(i.e. higher profitability, higher cost efficiency and
higher stability) that is enjoyed in the years fol-
lowing the migration. This supports our hypoth-
esis that banks which change their BM improve
their performance post-migration more than non-
switching banks.
Exogenously driven migrations
To answer our third research question, we now fo-
cus on those migrations driven by exogenous cir-
cumstances. We expect that different reasons be-
hind the decision to migrate might have a diverse
impact on performance outcomes. To this end, we
focus on two subsamples: (a) banks that, follow-
ing an acquisition, continue to operate as separate
entities (that is, the acquired bank becomes an in-
tegral part of the acquiring banking group) and
both entities continue to trade with their original
names;14 and (b) banks that continue to operate
after receiving state aid, in the form of recapital-
izations, public guarantees or liquidity injections.
We argue that for targets, the change in the BM
might be imposed by the acquirer. Target banks
are often smaller institutions acquired by larger
14An example is the Halifax (UK), which is part of the
Lloyds Banking Group since the takeover in 2009 but
continues to trade under the Halifax brand. This allows
us to continue observing both the acquirer and the ac-
quired banks. We argue that the Halifax operating busi-
ness model is decided by the parent bank, Lloyds Banking
Group.
groups and, therefore, more likely to undergo
substantial corporate restructuring initiated by
the bidder post-acquisition. Similarly, for troubled
banks, the change in the BM might be a pre-
condition to accessing government funding. We
then consider banks which switch BM following
acquisitions or state aid and compare them with
matched banks who do not. In this way, we aim to
isolate the effects of migrations from the impact
of acquisitions or state aid on bank performance.
The results of this analysis are shown in Table 8.
Table 8 (Panel A) reports the impact of BM
changes following acquisitions. Our results suggest
that, after an initial deterioration in the year of
migration, the cost-to-income ratio of migrating
banks improves more than that of non-migrating
banks. We also find a positive effect on prof-
itability (ROA). It seems that acquired banks that
change their BM improve their cost efficiency
and profitability more than those banks that only
face one extraordinary operation (acquisitions).
Vander Vennet and Gropp (2003) and Al-Sharkas,
Hassan and Lawrence (2008) provide evidence that
M&As have a positive effect on bank cost effi-
ciency. We add to these findings by showing that
the positive impact on cost efficiency post-merger
is driven by changes in the BM. We also find that
acquired banks that change BM improve their sta-
bility more than acquired banks that do not (the
coefficient of Z-score is positive and significant in
all the time windows).
Table 8(Panel B) reports the estimates of the ef-
fects of migrations for banks that received state
aid.We find that, in the year of migration and sub-
sequent years, troubled banks that also changed
BM experience an increase in their Z-score. These
results are in line with the aims of governments,
which, during the financial crisis, supported their
problem banks in exchange for a significant re-
structuring of the banks’ activities deemed neces-
sary to foster financial stability.
Additional analysis and robustness tests
Migration effects and specific business models
The performance effect of migrations may differ
depending on the BM towards which the bank
moves. To test the implication of switches to spe-
cific BMs, we re-ran our analysis considering only
migrating banks and identify differences in relative
performance.
© 2020 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British
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Table 8. The effect of externally imposed migrations
ATET Coefficient Std. Error 95% confidence interval
Panel A: Effects of migrations on banks involved in acquisitions as targets
ROAt − ROAt −0.018 0.015 −0.048 0.011
ROAt+1 − ROAt 0.003* 0.001 −0.000 0.007
ROAt+2− ROAt 0.003 0.003 −0.002 0.009
Zt − Zt−1 2.185* 1.319 −0.401 4.772
Zt+1 − Zt 0.017* 1.836 −3.581 3.617
Zt+2 − Zt 0.975* 1.347 −1.666 3.617
C_It – C_It−1 0.376 0.434 −0.475 1.227
C_It+1 – C_It −0.551* 0.338 −1.214 0.110
C_It+2 – C_It 0.607* 0.335 −1.264 0.0502
RWAt – RWAt−1 −0.028 0.031 −0.0896 0.032
RWAt+1 – RWAt 0.001 0.011 −0.020 0.024
RWAt+2 – RWAt 0.003 0.016 −0.029 0.035
Panel B: Effects on migration of banks that received state aid
ROAt − ROAt−1 −0.001 0.006 −0.013 0.012
ROAt+1 − ROAt 0.004 0.017 −0.029 0.028
ROAt+2− ROAt 0.015 0.017 −0.018 0.048
Zt − Zt−1 0.849* 0.920 −0.954 2.652
Zt+1 − Zt 0.195* 1.020 −1.804 2.196
Zt+2 − Zt 0.279 1.427 −2.518 3.076
C_It – C_It−1 −0.135 0.764 −0.633 1.363
C_It+1 – C_It −0.914 0.683 −2.253 0.424
C_It+2 – C_It −0.914 0.815 −2.513 0.684
RWAt – RWAt−1 0.002 0.158 −0.030 0.031
RWAt+1 – RWAt −0.011 0.013 −0.037 0.015
RWAt+2 – RWAt 0.006 0.024 −0.041 0.053
Note: The table reports the results of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). If the ATET is different from zero, the change
in the performance indicator over the time window is different for switching banks, compared to their matched non-switching peers. We
matched migrating banks with banks that never migrate during the period investigated, on the propensity score, by means of nearest-
neighbour matching with replacement, with a 1% caliper. In the acquisition subsample there are 1,379 bank-year observations, relative
to 454 banks. There are 99 migrations during the period observed. In the state-aid subsample, there are 285 bank-year observations,
relative to 40 banks, of which 25 are migrating banks. The outputs are: ROA as a proxy of bank’s profitability, Z-score as a proxy of risk
of default, the cost-to-income ratio (C_I) as a proxy of bank’s cost efficiency, RWA is the risk-weighted assets density and is a proxy
of risk appetite. We test the effect on different time windows. The matching variables are those used in the main analysis to measure
the propensity score. Number of matches is equal to 4.
∗** Statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
The results, reported in Table 9, show that mi-
gration outcomes differ according to the specific
BM in which banks move. Banks that move to the
focused retail BM improve their cost efficiency at
the expense of profitability more than other mi-
grating banks. Specifically, we do not find that in-
vestment banks moving to a retail BM improve
their ROA. In this case, banks switching to a more
retail-focused BM are increasing traditional lend-
ing, a strategy that, considering the present low
interest-rate environment, does not necessarily de-
liver higher performance.
In general, our results underline that BMmigra-
tions positively affect bank performance, and, on
average, migrating banks perform better than non-
migrating banks. However, we show that the po-
tential benefits depend on the choice of the BM,
as some switches improve performance (in terms
of profitability, stability, cost efficiency and risk)
more than others. This result emphasizes that not
all migrations are equal and deliver the same re-
sults. The choice of BM in which to move can de-
pend on (or is closely connectedwith) the final goal
of this change (being either increasing profitability,
improving efficiency, or decreasing risk).
The sample size of migrating banks does not
allow us to investigate the effects of migration,
considering both the starting BM and the BM
after migration. To overcome this problem, we
categorize BMs in two main clusters: (i) diversi-
fied, including diversified retail (type 1 and type
2); (ii) specialized, comprising those BMs that are
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Table 9. The effect of migration to specific business models
ATET Focused retail Type 1 Type 2 Wholesale Investment
ROAt − ROAt−1 0.001 −0.001 −0.012 0.021 −0.046
ROAt+1 − ROAt −0.002* 0.002 0.002* −0.014 0.052
ROAt+2 − ROAt −0.001 0.002 0.003 −0.002 0.056
Zt − Zt−1 −0.302 −1.154 −7.697 −3.036 4.998
Zt+1 − Zt −0.641 2.227* −3.678 1.423 8.365*
Zt+2 − Zt −1.792 1.969 −9.522 1.995 5.596
C_It – C_It−1 −0.048 −0.004 −0.010 0.108 0.267
C_It+1 – C_It 0.025 −0.080 0.005 −1.265 −0.142
C_It+2 – C_It −0.046* 0.009 −0.006 0.357 −0.091
RWAt – RWAt−1 0.001 −0.004 −0.087 −0.048* 0.348
RWAt+1 – RWAt −0.001 0.134 −0.033 −0.036 −0.290
RWAt+2 – RWAt −0.012 −0.017 −0.078 −0.015 −0.635
Note: The table reports the results of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). We match migrating banks to each BM to
detect whether migrating in a specific BM produces better outcomes. Due to the small number of banks in this subsample, to have
an adequate number of matches, the control sample consists of all the observations in BMs to which a bank does not migrate. In the
second column, we compare banks that migrated to the focused retail BM to all other migrations; in the third column, we compare
banks that migrated to the diversified retail (type 1) BM to all other migrations; in the fourth column, we compare banks that migrated
to the diversified retail (type 2) BM to all other migrations; in the fifth column, we compare banks that migrated to the wholesale BM
to all other migrations; in the last column, we compare banks that migrated to the investment BM to all other migrations. The outputs
are: ROA as a proxy of bank’s profitability, Z-score as a proxy of risk of default, the cost-to-income ratio as a proxy of a bank’s cost
efficiency. RWA is the risk-weighted asset density and is a proxy of risk appetite. We test the effect on different time windows. The
matching variables are those used in the main analysis to measure the propensity score.
∗**, *** Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
oriented towards a more specialized activity (i.e.
focused retail, investment and wholesale). Simi-
larly, we categorize BM switching into (1) banks
that become more diversified vs. (2) banks that
become more focused. In this way, we can analyse
the effects of migrations from a more diversified
BM towards amore specialized one and vice versa.
Results are reported in Table OA.1 in the Online
Appendix and, not surprisingly, indicate that
migrating banks that move to a more specialized
BM reduce their costs more than banks that move
in more diversified BMs.
Robustness tests
To check the robustness of our results, we re-ran
our analysis excluding small cooperative banks.
The findings of this analysis are reported in Tables
OA.2 and OA.3 in the Online Appendix and are in
line with those obtained in the main analysis. We
also re-ran the analysis excluding banks that adopt
the investment BM, to focus on migrations that do
not depend on the sale of trading assets. Results
are reported in Tables OA.4 and OA.5 and corrob-
orate our main findings, both in terms of variables
that determine the change in the BM and in terms
of the effect on bank performance.
Discussion and conclusions
This study evaluates the effects of BM migra-
tions in the European banking industry during
a period characterized by profound economic,
technological and regulatory changes. Banks face
unprecedented threats arising from a combination
of factors, such as a damaged reputation, low
interest rates, increased digitalization and intensi-
fying competition from non-banks. These trends
were compounded by the sovereign debt crisis,
which left many banks in several EU countries in
need of government bailouts. The re-evaluation
of existing BMs is one of the key strategic pri-
orities of banks’ senior management, in order to
remain profitable in a fast-changing institutional
and macroeconomic environment. Against this
background, we collected data for a large sample
of banks of different sizes and ownership struc-
tures during the period 2010–2017. Our analysis
offers important insights and contributes to the
current debate on the structural reforms of the EU
banking sector following the turmoil that ensued
from the financial and Eurozone crises. Based on a
unique definition of BMs and a robust clustering
method, we identify the five BMs EU banks oper-
ate with and track their evolution over the sample
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period. We find that BMs are generally stable, but
a substantial part of the sector changed strategic
orientation during the sample period. These BM
changes do not lead to a banking sector concentra-
tion in a particular BM, but each bank’s strategic
decision depends on its key internal objectives. For
our sample banks, the main drivers of BM migra-
tion were related to performance improvements:
our results show that larger, less profitable and
riskier banks are more likely to change their BM.
Is this migration useful, in terms of the ulti-
mate supervisory goals of a more profitable and
more stable banking system? Our findings suggest
that in the years after migration, banks’ perfor-
mance improves – in terms of profitability, stability
and cost efficiency – compared to non-migrating
banks. Our findings also indicate that the effect of
migration differs depending on the BM to which
the bank moves. We show that switches to some
BMs improve performance more than others, sug-
gesting that banksmay choose a specific BMbased
on their short-term objectives, as well as their long-
term plans.
We also conjectured that migrations exoge-
nously imposed on bank management could lead
to different results (vis-à-vis non-switchers). For
this reason, we investigated the ex-post outcomes
of migrations following an acquisition or follow-
ing state aid, as examples of exogenously driven
migrations. We find that the performance effect of
exogenous switches is to improve cost efficiency
and stability, rather than profitability. In particu-
lar, we show that banks which changed their BM
post-bailout improved their stability more com-
pared to those which did not change. Government
interventions in the banking sector are one of the
key manifestations of the impact of a challeng-
ing macroeconomic and institutional environment
on banks’ strategic decisions. Our results provide
support for government decisions to grant public
funds to troubled banks in exchange for a thor-
ough corporate restructuring.
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